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篇目详细内容 |
【篇名】 |
Assumptions of Gain Preference and Choice ofAction by States in International Legislation:From the Perspective of International Relations |
【刊名】 |
Frontiers of Law in China |
【刊名缩写】 |
Front. Law China |
【ISSN】 |
1673-3428 |
【EISSN】 |
1673-3541 |
【DOI】 |
10.1007/s11463-010-0102-4 |
【出版社】 |
Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag |
【出版年】 |
2010 |
【卷期】 |
5
卷3期 |
【页码】 |
342-375
页,共
34
页 |
【作者】 |
Zhiyun Liu;
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【关键词】 |
gain preference; game theory; international law; internationalorganization |
【摘要】 |
Upon entry into the vision of scholars in international relations, gametheory has quickly become an effective approach to analyzing internationalconflicts and cooperation, and has been broadly adopted by neo-realism andneo-liberalism, which are two dominating aspects in the current theories ofinternational relations. The former argues that the states participating in the gamealways follow relative gains, hence achieving a pessimistic conclusion oninternational cooperation, while the latter argues that the states participating inthe game always follow absolute gains and deduces an optimistic prospect forinternational cooperation, which provides a useful way to analyze theconfrontation and cooperation of states in international legislative game. Ofcourse, it is aware that gain preference and choice of action by states ininternational legislative game are also conditioned by other factors. |
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