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篇目详细内容 |
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【篇名】 |
Security research with Square attack to a variant Camellia cipher |
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【刊名】 |
Frontiers of Electrical and Electronic Engineering in China |
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【刊名缩写】 |
Front. Electr. Electron. Eng. China |
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【ISSN】 |
1673-3460 |
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【EISSN】 |
1673-3584 |
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【DOI】 |
10.1007/s11460-010-0095-x |
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【出版社】 |
Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag Berlin
Heidelberg |
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【出版年】 |
2010 |
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【卷期】 |
5
卷4期 |
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【页码】 |
482-487
页,共
6
页 |
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【作者】 |
Xiangyang XU;
Guangsheng ZHANG;
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【关键词】 |
block cipher; Camellia; Square attack |
【摘要】 |
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This paper investigates the relation between the choice of S-boxes and Square attack. A variant Camellia, which uses only a single S-box instead of four, is proposed. The security of the variant Camellia against Square attack is studied in detail. Result shows that it needs only 28 chosen plaintexts to recover a byte of the 6th round-key of variant Camellias, while the original Camellia needs either 28 chosen plaintexts to recover a byte of the 6th round-key and a byte of some constant or 216 chosen plaintexts to recover a byte of the 6th round-key. Furthermore, Square attacks on other round-reduced variant Camellia are proposed, and the time complexity of 11-round attack is reduced from 2250 to 2225.5. The weaker variant Camellia indicates that the choice of S-box and the order of different S-boxes have influence on Square attack. |
